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SPORTS MEDICINE CONFLICTS: TEAM PHYSICIANS vs. 
ATHLETE–PATIENTS 
STEVE P. CALANDRILLO* 
Abstract: Team physicians for professional sports franchises face a conflict 
of interest created by the competing loyalties they owe to the team that 
employs them and to the athlete–patient they must treat.  Marketing 
agreements under which physicians pay significant sums of money to be 
designated as the team’s “official healthcare provider” exacerbate this conflict.  
These marketing arrangements call into question the independent judgment of 
team physicians and cause players to question the quality of care they receive.  
This paper explores several solutions to the growing conflicts between athletes 
and team doctors with the goal of enhancing players’ trust in the medical care 
they receive.  First, to remove the dual loyalty problem faced by team 
physicians, professional sports leagues or players’ unions should hire medical 
providers directly—as opposed to having individual teams employ and provide 
them.  If this fundamental employment change proves impossible, physician 
groups should enter into explicit agreements with sports franchises that assert 
the groups’ independence, and professional sports leagues should mandate that 
physicians disclose all potential conflicts of interest to the players they treat.  
In addition, sports leagues could ban physicians from advertising their 
affiliation with teams to alleviate the problem of doctors engaging in bidding 
wars to service athletes at below-market rates in order to gain a “PR” edge on 
their competition.  Finally, states might consider exceptions to the exclusive 
remedy provisions of workers’ compensation laws to ensure that professional 
athletes have legal recourse when they suffer the deleterious effects of these 
conflicts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sitting on Bill Stanfill’s mantel is a jar filled with a clear solution and 
small ball sitting at the bottom.1  It is the ball of his left hip that was removed 
in 2000 as a result of avascular necrosis, a serious medical condition that 
occurs when blood circulation to the bone is cut off and the bone dies.2  At 54, 
he is not the type of person you expect to see navigating with a walker, but 
Stanfill is a former professional football player.3  His hip injury was caused by 
repeated trauma and, possibly, repeated cortisone injections while he played 
football.4  His other hip will likely require surgery in the near future.5 
Stanfill is one of many professional athletes who suffers from permanent 
disability as a result of repeated injuries sustained while playing professional 
sports.6  Professional athletes face tremendous pressure to get back on the field 
from coaches, management, and the players themselves.7  This can lead to 
serious physical disabilities for elite athletes. 
Magnifying the problem are growing conflicts of interest faced by the team 
physicians who treat these athletes.8  Physicians confront dual loyalty problems 
 
 1. William Nack, The Wrecking Yard: As They Limp Into the Sunset, Retired NFL Players 
Struggle with the Game’s Grim Legacy: A Lifetime of Disability and Pain, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
May 7, 2001, at 60, 68. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 69. 
 6. See Gene Wojciechowski & Chris Dufresne, Life Expectancy Low, Some Say: Football 
Career is Taking its Toll on NFL’s Players, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1988, Part III (Sports), at 1 
(discussing Los Angeles Times survey, which found that 78% of professional football players 
surveyed suffered some permanent disability).  Many of the findings of this 1988 study were 
replicated by the NFL Players Association in its 2000 survey of players.  See Gene Frenette & P. 
Douglas Filaroski, Medicine and the NFL, an Uneasy Partnership, FLA. TIMES UNION, Dec. 15, 
2002, at A-1. 
 7. This Paper primarily addresses external pressure on athletes to return to the playing 
field, but we should be careful not to underestimate athletes’ internal drive to play even when 
hurt.  One often will hear athletes voice the adage, “no pain, no gain”—reflecting the belief that 
some degree of suffering is necessary to achieve athletic glory.  A powerful recent example is 
Boston Red Sox hurler Curt Schilling, who pitched his team to the 2004 American League 
Championship and World Series title despite a ruptured tendon-sheath seeping blood into his 
shoe.  See Tyler Kepner, Red Sox Erase 86 Years of Futility in 4 Games, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 
2004, at A1.  Furthermore, society as a whole often looks upon individuals who have overcome 
great pain as a marker of heroism.  For example, we all admire the suffering endured by former 
army POW Jessica Lynch and paralyzed actor Christopher Reeve, and many view them as heroes 
precisely because of what they have undergone.  See, e.g., James Dao, Private Lynch Comes Back 
Home to a Celebration Fit for a Hero, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at A1; Douglas Martin, 
Christopher Reeve, 52, Symbol of Courage, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A1. 
 8. See Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13 (“Team doctors are left to strike a 
balance between the interest of the players and the team.”).  In defining the term “conflict of 
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stemming from both the employment relationship and marketing arrangements 
they have entered into with their sports franchise employer.  When physicians 
are hired directly by a team to treat its players (and therefore answer to 
management), there is often subtle or even overt pressure to return injured 
athletes to the field prematurely in order to maximize the team’s chances of 
winning.9  Furthermore, given the marketing edge and prestige associated with 
being named the “official healthcare provider” for a major athletic franchise, 
physician groups often compete with each other to offer these services for a 
reduced fee or for free.10  As a result, medical decisions may be made that are 
not in the best interest of the player and his health, but rather which are in the 
short-run interests of the team.  As the doctor’s duty to her patient becomes 
compromised, players’ trust in the medical advice being offered by the team 
physician slowly erodes. 
This conflict of interest between team physicians and the athlete–patients 
they treat must be remedied by aggressively implementing policies and 
procedures that change the current relationship between healthcare providers, 
teams, and their players.  Part I of this Paper examines the various duties that a 
team physician owes her athlete–patient.  Part II details the nature of the 
relationship between teams, physicians, and players, and Part III explains how 
these relationships cause conflicts of interest to arise.  Finally, Part IV outlines 
policy solutions that would remedy the diverging interests that team doctors 
face.11 
I.  DOCTOR’S DUTY TO HER PATIENT 
Physicians operate under a number of professional codes and regulations 
that delineate their professional responsibilities to their patients.  The 
American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics states that a 
 
interest,” the line between potential and actual conflict of interest is a matter of some debate.  See 
MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 8–
9 (1993).  As Rodwin points out, some only use the term “conflict of interest” to refer to 
situations of tangible acts of disloyal behavior.  Id. at 9.  Similar to Rodwin’s definition, for the 
purposes of this article, conflicts of interest refer to situations that have the capacity to cause 
harm, rather than solely instances of actual harm.  See id. 
 9. See Sigmund J. Solares, Preventing Medical Malpractice of Team Physicians in 
Professional Sports: A Call for the Players Unions to Hire the Team Physicians in Professional 
Sports, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 235, 236 (1997). 
 10. Nick DiCello, Note, No Pain, No Gain, No Compensation: Exploiting Professional 
Athletes Through Substandard Medical Care Administered by Team Physicians, 49 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 507, 517 (2001); Twila Keim, Comment, Physicians for Professional Sports Teams: Health 
Care Under the Pressure of Economic and Commercial Interests, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 
196, 215–16 (1999). 
 11. While this Paper focuses on all professional sports teams, football is prominently 
featured in the discussions and anecdotes because it creates many serious injuries that have 
become the source of disputes and litigation. 
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physician’s paramount concern must be the well-being of her patient.12  
Healthcare providers are “bound not to let any other interest interfere with that 
of the patient in being cured.”13 
Doctors are also bound by the requirements of the Hippocratic Oath.14  The 
original version of the Oath stated that physicians must endeavor to prevent 
“harm and injustice” to their patients.15  One modern version of the 
Hippocratic Oath, the Oath of Lasagna, requires that doctors take all necessary 
measures to heal the sick, while avoiding the “twin traps of overtreatment and 
therapeutic nihilism.”16 
Given the special risks that participation in sports presents, the AMA also 
maintains distinct regulations for physicians who treat athletes.  AMA Code of 
Medical Ethics § 3.06 requires that physicians assist players in making 
“informed decisions about their participation in amateur and professional 
contact sports which entail risks of bodily injury.”17  A physician’s only 
consideration should be the medical care of the participant—the desire of the 
athlete, the team, or its fans to see the athlete back on the field should not be 
controlling.18  The AMA also explicitly obliges physicians to avoid conflicts of 
interest.  AMA Code of Medical Ethics § 8.03 states that “[u]nder no 
circumstances may physicians place their own financial interests above the 
welfare of their patients.”19  Moreover, any conflict between a physician’s 
financial interest and her responsibility to the patient must be resolved to the 
patient’s benefit.20 
Finally, beyond professional regulation, healthcare providers face potential 
tort liability for the medical services they render, and therefore must follow the 
relevant standard of care in their treatment of athlete–patients.21  As Joseph 
King has outlined, “[T]eam physician[s] should perform with the level of 
knowledge, skill, and care that is expected of a reasonably competent medical 
practitioner under similar circumstances, taking into account reasonable limits 
 
 12. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS xiv (2004–2005) (Preamble). 
 13. RODWIN, supra note 8, at 8 (quoting Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on 
Experimenting with Human Subjects, 1969 DAEDALUS 219, 238). 
 14. For a translation of the original Oath, see LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: 
TEXT, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION (Henry E. Sigerist ed., 1943). 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. Barbara A. Gabriel, A Hippocratic Oath for Our Time, ASSOC’N OF AM. MED. 
COLLEGES REP. (Sept. 2001), http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/sept2001/hippocrati 
coath.htm. 
 17. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 12, § 3.06. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. § 8.03 (outlining conflict of interest rules). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 8.08 (1979). 
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that have been placed on the scope of the physician’s undertaking.”22  Thus, 
physicians who treat athletes must be cognizant of a host of relevant 
professional regulations and common law standards that govern the medical 
care they provide. 
A. Conflict of Interest Defined 
While these professional and legal obligations may seem obvious, they are 
increasingly threatened by conflicts of interest that arise between team 
physicians and their athlete–patients today.  In general, a conflict of interest is 
considered to exist when competing duties cannot be resolved without 
compromising known obligations.23  To rise to this level, physicians’ divergent 
obligations must “compromise their independent judgment or their loyalty to 
patients.”24  Others define a conflict of interest as existing when a subsystem 
that is a component of a larger system deliberately enhances its interest to the 
detriment of the whole.25  It is not necessary that an actual injury occur as a 
result of a conflict of interest between a physician and her patient—rather, the 
creation of the capacity to cause injury and the corresponding erosion of trust 
between physicians and their patients is harm enough alone.  When the 
interests of doctors and patients are at odds, there is increased risk that the 
physician may abuse, and eventually lose, the trust of her patient, further 
jeopardizing healthcare decisions being made. 
II.  RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS, PLAYERS, AND THE TEAM 
A. Employer–Employee Relationship Between Team and Physician 
At the heart of the tension facing team physicians is the dual loyalty 
problem created by their employment relationship with the sports franchise 
that hires them.  All professional sports teams provide for a physician to be 
available to players, usually through team policy or a collective bargaining 
agreement.26  These physicians may be general practitioners, but are often 
 
 22. Joseph H. King Jr., The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18 HOUS. L. 
REV. 657, 692 (1981). 
 23. RODWIN, supra note 8, at 9. 
 24. Id. 
 25. E.g., Joseph M. McGuire, Conflict of Interest: Whose Interest? And What Conflict?, in 
ETHICS, FREE ENTERPRISE, & PUBLIC POLICY 214, 216 (Richard T. De George & Joseph A. 
Pichler eds., 1978). 
 26. See, e.g., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT 
COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 2002–2008, art. XLIV (2002), 
http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete#art44 [hereinafter NFL 
CBA]. 
Each Club will have a board-certified orthopedic surgeon as one of its Club physicians.  
The cost of medical services rendered by Club physicians will be the responsibility of the 
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orthopedic surgeons.27  Within these arrangements, teams directly hire, fire, 
and pay the doctors to treat their players.28  Thus, employee-physicians owe 
allegiance to their employer-teams, while simultaneously owing a duty of 
loyalty to the athlete–patients they treat on a daily basis.29  Notably, the AMA 
requires that any contractual relationship entered into by physicians with teams 
be free from lay interference in medical matters, and that a doctor’s primary 
responsibility be to her patient.30  Nevertheless, team management often 
intervenes in medical decision-making regarding its players, placing the 
physician in an ethically compromised position.31  On the one hand, the 
physician is under a legal and professional duty to provide medical services in 
the best interests of the athlete–patient.  On the other, team management has 
hired that physician to serve the team’s interest, which usually includes getting 
valuable athletes back onto the playing field sooner rather than later.32  It is not 
uncommon, then, that team physicians make decisions that are influenced by 
 
respective Clubs.  If a Club physician advises a coach or other Club representative of a 
player’s physical condition which adversely affects the player’s performance or health, 
the physician will also advise the player.  If such condition could be significantly 
aggravated by continued performance, the physician will advise the player of such fact in 
writing before the player is again allowed to perform on-field activity. 
Id. 
 27. See id. (requiring every NFL team to have an orthopedic surgeon as one of its club 
physicians); see also Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Legal Issues in Sports Medicine: A Synthesis, 
Summary, and Analysis, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 5, 10 (2002). 
 28. Mitten, supra note 27, at 8.  Complicating these relationships are conflicts of interest that 
arise when professional teams take bids from medical groups to be the “official” healthcare 
provider for the team.  See infra Part III.B. 
 29. Some have analogized these dual duties to the diverging interests that so-called 
“company doctors” might have faced in the past—i.e., physicians who were employed by 
companies to care for the firm’s employees.  See, e.g., Roger S. Magnusson & Hayden Opie, HIV 
and Hepatitis in Sports: An Australian Legal Framework for Resolving Hard Cases, 5 SETON 
HALL J. SPORT L. 69, 101 (1995).  While there may have been some conflict if management 
wanted to see a sick employee back at work, the conflict facing company doctors is much more 
muted than the dilemma facing team physicians.  Team physicians must treat patients whose 
injuries are directly caused by their line of work, unlike company doctors who primarily treated 
employees for sicknesses unrelated to their job.  Compounding the problem is that the “job” of an 
athlete involves considerably greater risk to health than the risk that most any other company 
imposes on its employees. 
 30. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 12, § 8.05. 
 31. See, e.g., ROB HUIZENGA, YOU’RE OKAY, IT’S JUST A BRUISE: A DOCTOR’S SIDELINE 
SECRETS ABOUT PRO FOOTBALL’S MOST OUTRAGEOUS TEAM 166 (1994) (describing how Los 
Angeles Raiders’ owner Al Davis sent a message to injured player Marcus Allen ordering him to 
“take a shot” from the team doctor for his injury). 
 32. Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians and Competitive Athletes: Allocating Legal 
Responsibility for Athletic Injuries, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 129, 140 (1993).  Of course, some teams 
may “play it safe” and hold elite athletes out of competition until they are 100% certain that the 
player’s injury has healed, but more often the pressure is to get star athletes back on the field 
instead of keeping them in the training room. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
192 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:185 
team management in ways contrary to the player’s best interests.  In sum, the 
dual loyalty of team physicians under the current employment structure is a 
recipe for player distrust and skepticism regarding the medical advice being 
offered by team doctors.33 
In addition to these pressures from team management, physicians also face 
pressure from coaches to get their players back on the field.  In a deposition for 
a medical malpractice claim by a player, former Jacksonville Jaguars’ head 
coach Tom Coughlin candidly admitted that he “can and will exert as much 
pressure on the player and the doctors to get the player [back] on the field.”34  
Testimony in the case alleged that Coughlin would walk past injured players in 
rehabilitation and say derisively, “Oh, look at the sick, lame and lazy.”35  
Coaches know that winning is paramount to their success.  As one former team 
physician stated, “There is no loyalty except to winning.  In the NFL, owners 
and coaches can treat employees in ways that would immediately provoke a 
successful lawsuit in any other business.”36 
B. Marketing Arrangements Between Teams and Healthcare Providers 
Complicating the matter today is the emerging practice in sports medicine 
of auctioning off the right to be a team’s “official” medical provider, hospital, 
or physician-group.37  The privilege of being selected generally comes with the 
right to advertise in one’s promotional materials that her group has been named 
the official healthcare provider of a particular professional sports franchise.38  
In return, the team is provided medical care for free or at reduced cost.39  These 
entrepreneurial arrangements began in 1995 with the expansion of the NFL 
into Jacksonville, Florida and Charlotte, North Carolina.40  The Carolina 
Panthers’ winning bid went to a medical group, Carolinas Medical Center, 
which was willing to gift the team $400,000 worth of medical supplies and 
 
 33. See, e.g., Angelo Cataldi & Glen Macnow, Team Doctors: A Crisis in Ethics: A Question 
of Trust for Athletes, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 19, 1989, at 1-A (describing professional hockey 
player Mike Robitaille’s fear and distrust toward his team doctor as a growing trend among 
athletes). 
 34. Selena Roberts, Coughlin’s Biggest Risk is Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2004, at D1 
(detailing a malpractice cause of action brought by Jeff Novak against the Jacksonville Jaguars 
and team physician Stephen Lucie). 
 35. Id. at D5. 
 36. PIERCE E. SCRANTON, JR., PLAYING HURT: TREATING AND EVALUATING THE 
WARRIORS OF THE NFL 153 (2001). 
 37. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 38. Bill Pennington, Sports Turnaround: The Team Doctors Now Pay the Team, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Joseph Nocera, Bitter Medicine: Eager to Hold on to Their Valuable Sideline Practices, 
Team Doctors All Too Often Strive to Help the Club, Not Heal the Player, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
Nov. 6, 1995, at 76, 84. 
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equipment and further provide medical services at managed care rates.41  Soon 
after the New York Yankees won the World Series in 1999, they began to offer 
the right to be the official team hospital in advertising and marketing.42  
Several hospitals, including the Yankees’ longtime healthcare provider, 
declined to participate, fearing that these arrangements might undermine 
medical care.43 
Unfortunately for the state of sports medicine, these marketing agreements 
provide significant benefits for team physicians, both in terms of clients and 
prestige.  Methodist Hospital, which provides medical services to the NFL’s 
Houston Texans, found that their association with the Texans is the number- 
one driver of new calls from prospective patients.44  It is estimated that half of 
the major sports teams in the United States now have some kind of financial or 
marketing arrangement to provide medical services.45  Within a decade, 
experts believe that number will reach 90%.46  From both the team’s and 
provider’s perspective, these arrangements make sound financial sense.  The 
larger question, however, is at what cost to the athlete’s interest and to the 
doctor–patient relationship do these entrepreneurial agreements come? 
C. Team Doctors as Partial Owners of Sports Franchises 
In addition to the previously outlined sources of conflicts arising in sports 
medicine, there exists another, albeit rare, source of physician–patient tension: 
team doctors who maintain an ownership interest in their team.  The classic 
example is Arthur Pappas, who served as both part owner and team physician 
for the Boston Red Sox until his resignation in 2002.47  Pappas’ dual 
relationship led to player and public criticism that he was compromising his 
 
 41. Alexander Wolff & Christian Stone, Scorecard: Hippocratic Oath?, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, May 8, 1995, at 12, 12.  This type of arrangement also highlights the conflicts 
inherent in managed care medicine.  Physicians are often paid a set capitated fee per patient up 
front and then run the risk of providing excess care at their own expense.  Furthermore, patients 
must make it past primary care physician “gatekeepers” before they can be referred to a specialist.  
Not surprisingly, patients often complain that their physicians are incentivized to shortchange 
them in order to maximize their own profits.  See generally Steve P. Calandrillo, Corralling 
Kevorkian: Regulating Physician-Assisted Suicide in America, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 41, 72–
77 (1999) (discussing the potential impact of managed care medicine on the physician-assisted 
suicide debate). 
 42. William Sherman, Hospitals Team Up with Yanks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2000, at 
24. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Pennington, supra note 38, at D4. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., id. (quoting Dean Bonham of the Bonham Group, an organization that 
negotiates and arranges sports sponsorship deals). 
 47. See Joe Giuliotti, Barrett Awarded $1.7M, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 26, 1995, at 101. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
194 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:185 
athletes’ best interests for the short-term benefit of the team.48 Former pitcher 
Butch Henry alleged that Pappas ordered him to play, despite a torn anterior 
cruciate ligament (ACL) in his knee.49  Henry also claimed that players 
throughout Major League Baseball were hesitant to play in Boston because of 
the club’s reputation for inadequately caring for injured athletes.50  As 
anecdotal evidence, Marty Barrett, former Red Sox second baseman, won a 
$1.7 million dollar judgment against Pappas after alleging that he failed to 
disclose the seriousness of Barrett’s torn ACL.51  In his suit, Barrett claimed 
that Pappas placed team interests in front of Barrett’s health,52 clearing him to 
play too quickly in the midst of the Red Sox’ 1989 pennant chase.53  Perhaps 
the most damaging testimony came from former manager Joe Morgan, who 
recalled a meeting between him and Pappas in which the latter directly 
admitted, “[B]y the condition of [Barrett’s] knee, he would not have a long 
career.”54  Barrett prevailed on his medical negligence cause of action, but U.S. 
District Court Judge Nathaniel Gorton found that there was no direct evidence 
of misplaced interest.55 
III.  THE TEAM PHYSICIAN’S DUAL LOYALTY TO THE EMPLOYER AND TO THE 
ATHLETE–PATIENT POSES A SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
A. Employment Relationship 
The fact that physicians are employees of the team whose athletes they 
treat creates conflicts of interest that are difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy 
ethically.  When a team hires a medical provider, the purpose of that 
employment relationship is to further the interests of the sports franchise.  Not 
surprisingly, the goal of team management is to run a successful business 
organization, which generally means maximizing both wins and profit.56  With 
 
 48. See Phil O’Neill, Pappas Resigns Medical Role with Red Sox, WORCESTER TELEGRAM 
& GAZETTE, Sept. 17, 2002, at D2. 
 49. Sean McAdam, Heaping Dose of Criticism Leaves Sox’ Pappas in Guarded Condition, 
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Mar. 12, 1999, at D1. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Giuliotti, supra note 47, at 101. 
 52. See Nocera, supra note 40, at 87. 
 53. See id.  Unfortunately, doing so did little to change the Red Sox’ fortune, as they failed 
to make the playoffs, finishing in third place in the American League East.  See The Baseball 
Archive Database: 1989 Major League Standings, http://www.baseball1.com/statistics/team/std-
1989.html. 
 54. Nocera, supra note 40, at 88. 
 55. Giuliotti, supra note 47, at 101. 
 56. See Hal Lancaster, Is Sports Just Another Business? One Veteran Says, ‘Yes, Mostly,’ 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1985, at 17. 
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some professional sports teams operating as publicly traded companies57 and 
others considering the prospect of initial public offerings,58 the business nature 
of professional sports is abundantly clear.  As former Seattle Seahawks team 
physician Pierce Scranton bluntly stated in his tell-all exposé, Playing Hurt, 
“The balancing forces are the same in the NFL as in any other industry: fear 
and greed.”59 
The profit maximization pressures felt by team management are shared by 
physicians as well, as most play an indirect role in the management of the team 
by advising coaches regarding who is healthy and whom they should be 
concerned about.  For example, Dr. Scranton detailed his involvement in the 
organization’s process of evaluating who should remain on the team and who 
he felt was expendable.60  The fact that physicians are advising coaches about 
team personnel intertwines doctors and management, and makes a candid 
relationship between doctors and athletes nearly impossible.  Players are 
incentivized to withhold pertinent health information from the team physician 
out of fear that the information will be used against them.  Further 
deteriorating the doctor–patient relationship is the reality that team physicians 
may also be called upon to testify against their patients should a contract 
dispute arise.61  In the NFL, when a player is released by his team because he 
is physically unable to complete his contract, he may file a grievance with the 
league.62  The team physician may then be required to testify against the 
former player, a practice that is unheard of in any other doctor–patient 
context.63 
Unlike the team physician’s role as an employee in a profit-maximizing 
venture, the traditional relationship between doctor and patient has very 
different objectives and expectations.  Athlete–patients assume that their 
treating physician will exercise her best independent medical judgment and be 
loyal to them in giving medical advice.64  The AMA Code of Medical Ethics 
dictates that the patient has a right to be truthfully informed about his medical 
 
 57. See Brian R. Cheffins, Playing the Stock Market:”Going Public” and Professional Team 
Sports, 24 J. CORP. L., 641, 642 (1999). 
 58. See Sam Walker, Yankees, Nets May Issue Stock After Merger, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 
1999, at B7. 
 59. SCRANTON, supra note 36, at 143. 
 60. See id. at 37. 
 61. See HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 316. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See RODWIN, supra note 8, at 8.  If athletes did indeed possess full information about the 
conflicts their treating physician faced, one would expect that the risks posed by the conflict 
would be mitigated by athletes’ skepticism about any medical advice offered.  While there is 
growing awareness among athletes of the problem today, players in general would still like to 
assume that the team physician is relatively loyal to them and aims to effectuate their best 
medical interests. 
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care, including the risks and benefits of treatment options.65  Patients are 
entitled to be told of any potential conflicts of interest that their physician 
faces.66  Patients also have a right to confidentiality that should not be 
breached absent the patient’s consent.67  Unfortunately, these core elements of 
the doctor–patient relationship do not exist in the doctor–player relationship.  
Dr. Scranton opined that as a result of pressure from team management, “[t]he 
conventional doctor–patient relationship is nonexistent [in sports medicine], 
and the trust naturally fostered by such a relationship is consciously 
undermined by the organization.”68  These sentiments are echoed by Dr. Rob 
Huizenga, former team physician for the Los Angeles Raiders and past 
president of the NFL Physicians Society.69  In You’re OK, It’s Just a Bruise, 
Huizenga details his experience as a team physician and his eventual departure 
due to poor medical treatment of players and inappropriate interference by 
management.70  He reluctantly opined, “I thought I could be a team doctor and 
rise above the potential game-day pressures and conflict of interest. . . . I was 
wrong.”71  Such candid testimonials by physicians themselves underscore the 
serious problems posed by the conflicts inherent in today’s employment 
relationship between teams and physicians.  Athletes can no longer reasonably 
expect that their team doctor’s medical advice will be uninfluenced by strong 
pressures from above. 
B. Marketing Arrangements Exacerbate the Problem 
A disturbing escalation of the tension created by the employer–employee 
relationship is the increasing use of innovative marketing arrangements 
between medical groups and professional sports teams.  When physicians bid 
for the privilege of being named the “official” healthcare provider of a team (in 
order to gain an advertising advantage on their competition), they face the 
competing duties of their own financial interest in their agreement versus their 
overarching commitment to their patients.  Rather than receiving payment as 
they normally would for providing medical services, they are often paying for 
the opportunity to provide the services given the concomitant marketing 
benefits attached.  Such arrangements deepen the dual loyalty problems for 
team physicians—the pressure to retain the prestigious agreement with the 
sports franchise creates an incentive to ensure management is happy with the 
 
 65. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 12, § 10.01. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. SCRANTON, supra note 36, at 174. 
 69. See HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 315–17. 
 70. See id. at 263–64. 
 71. Id. at 317. 
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physician’s decision.72  Not surprisingly, this incentive conflicts with the 
physician’s obligation to ensure the well-being of her patient.73 
The rise of these marketing deals in recent years has led several team 
physicians and medical ethicists to cry foul.  Dr. Dan Brock, director of 
Harvard Medical School’s Division of Medical Ethics, criticized the 
arrangements as “unseemly” and lamented the “clear conflict of interest” 
created.74  Dr. Andrew Bishop, physician for the Atlanta Falcons, threatened to 
resign if the team entered a sponsorship agreement with a local hospital.75  
Bishop worried, “The perception is that if this [physician] was so eager to do 
this he’s willing to pay to do it, then he’s going to do whatever management 
wants to keep the job he paid for.”76  In addition to physician concerns, players 
have also expressed their dissatisfaction with these marketing agreements.  The 
chief operating officer of the Major League Baseball Players Association 
pointedly stated, “Our players do not like this trend in medical-care agreements 
one bit.”77  Quite reasonably, they believe it harms the trusting relationship 
between players and doctors, and undermines the credibility of team 
physicians.78 
C. Evidence of the Conflict 
Limited litigation data and empirical surveys of current and former 
professional athletes illustrate the existence of serious conflicts of interest 
faced by team physicians.  Unfortunately, there are relatively few lawsuits by 
professional athletes from which to garner information, primarily because the 
exclusive remedy provisions contained in many state workers’ compensation 
statutes bar such suits.79  Nevertheless, the survey results and litigation that do 
 
 72. See Scott Polsky, Comment, Winning Medicine: Professional Sports Team Doctors’ 
Conflicts of Interest, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 503, 515–19 (1998). 
 73. See id. at 519–20. 
 74. See Pennington, supra note 38, at D4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. E.g., Hendy v. Losse, 819 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1991) (injured professional football player’s 
medical malpractice action barred because workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for 
injuries by co-employees).  See generally DiCello, supra note 10, at 526–33 (discussing that 
under workers’ compensation laws, employees (including professional athletes) are generally 
prohibited from bringing suit against a fellow employee (e.g., team physicians) because the 
state’s workers’ compensation system is the exclusive remedy for injuries that occur on the job).  
There are limited exceptions to the exclusive remedy provisions of workers’ compensation, 
including torts committed by independent contractors, intentional torts, fraud, and injuries that 
fall under the “dual capacity” doctrine.  See id.  Additionally, a small number of states exclude 
professional athletes from workers’ compensation.  See id. at 529.  However, for the most part, 
workers’ compensation programs have worked to bar recovery for professional athletes for 
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exist chronicle serious problems caused by conflicts of interest that must be 
addressed if we are to restore athletes’ faith in the medical judgment being 
rendered by their team physicians. 
One of the first important steps in assessing the magnitude of the problem 
was taken by the Los Angeles Times.80  Its study of all retired NFL players 
provided a deeper understanding of the physical impact of playing professional 
football.  Shockingly, nearly four-fifths of players surveyed said they suffered 
permanent physical disabilities directly related to their playing careers.81  
Further, 60% of respondents believed that the NFL did not have their short- or 
long-term interests in mind.82  Worse, over half said that their best interests 
were at one point compromised by a team physician, and 43% would not have 
chosen the team physician as their own personal doctor if they were given a 
choice.83  The NFL Players Association survey of its members in 2000 
confirmed these findings, as one of the players’ primary concerns was medical 
treatment and their ability to initiate grievance procedures against team 
physicians that they felt rendered inappropriate medical advice.84 
In one of the first successful medical malpractice lawsuits by a player, 
former San Francisco Forty Niner Charlie Krueger sued the team physician for 
fraudulently concealing the extent of his injuries and giving him repeated 
treatments to return him to the playing field.85  As a result, Krueger now 
suffers from permanent disabilities, including severe arthritis and crippling 
degenerative pain that has left him unable to perform simple tasks such as 
standing, walking, or climbing stairs.86  After winning his case before the 
California Court of Appeals, Krueger was awarded $2.3 million as 
compensation for his injuries.87  At the time, it was the largest award ever 
 
injuries due to negligent medical care by team physicians.  See id. at 526.  For further reading 
regarding workers’ compensation laws affecting professional athletes, see Teresa Herbert, Are 
Player Injuries Adequately Compensated?, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 243, 263–75 (2000); Mitten, supra 
note 27, at 36–37. 
 80. See Wojciechowski & Dufresne, supra note 6, at 1; see also Frenette & Filaroski, supra 
note 6, at A-13 (replicating many of the findings of the 1988 Los Angeles Times survey). 
 81. See Wojciechowski & Dufresne, supra note 6, at 1. 
 82. Id. at 13 (table of survey questions and responses). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13 (including a team-by-team breakdown of 
the percentage of players who believe their team’s medical care was good or better and the 
percentage of players who believe it is important to institute mandatory second opinions). 
 85. See Krueger v. S.F. Forty Niners, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579, 580, 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
(depublished). 
 86. Jennifer Lynn Woodlief, The Trouble with Charlie, 9 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 4 (1991). 
 87. Id. at 3; see Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 585 (reversing, finding that the lower court 
decision was not based on substantial evidence and that Krueger established the required elements 
of his claim for fraudulent concealment of medical services).  On remand from the California 
Court of Appeals, the trial court awarded Krueger $66,000 in special damages and $2.3 million in 
general damages.  Woodlief, supra note 86, at 3.  After the California Supreme Court denied 
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against a professional sports team and the first time a player was successful in 
suing his team on the grounds of inappropriate medical treatment.88  However, 
the California Supreme Court denied review and decertified the Court of 
Appeals opinion without issuing a written opinion.89  This removed the 
decision as precedent and led to an out-of-court settlement, reportedly for 
greater than $1 million.90  In the depublished Court of Appeals decision, the 
judge noted, “[I]n its desire to keep [Krueger] on the playing field, [the team] 
consciously failed to make full, meaningful disclosure to him respecting the 
magnitude of the risk he took in continuing to play a violent contact sport with 
a profoundly damaged left knee.”91 
Another high-profile NFL case involved injuries sustained by Merril Hoge 
while a fullback for the Chicago Bears.92  In 2000, Hoge was awarded $1.55 
million for negligent treatment in response to a concussion that ended his 
football career.93  A jury found that the doctor treating him did not properly 
inform him of the dangers of returning to play too soon after an earlier 
concussion.94  Hoge continued to play without knowledge of the risk and 
suffered another concussion that led to the end of his playing career.95 
Conflicts involving medical care rendered by team physicians are not 
limited to the NFL, however.  Dave Babych of the National Hockey League’s 
Philadelphia Flyers fractured a bone in his left foot during a game in 1998.96  
Unfortunately, it was never properly set and he was given pain killers that 
allowed him to return to play too quickly, resulting in a career-ending injury.97  
Babych was successful in his medical malpractice cause of action against the 
team, winning a jury verdict of $1.37 million, but did not prevail on his charge 
of fraud against the team physician.98 
 
further review of the case and ordered the California Court of Appeals decision decertified and 
unpublished without a written opinion, Krueger settled with the team for between $1 million and 
$1.5 million.  Id. 
 88. Woodlief, supra note 86, at 3. 
 89. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 579. 
 90. Woodlief, supra note 86, at 3. 
 91. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 584. 
 92. See Mitten, supra note 27, at 28. 
 93. Id. at 28–29. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id.  Unfortunately, a new trial had to be ordered on appeal because Hoge’s trial 
attorney violated discovery rules by failing to provide the defendant with a letter from one of 
Hoge’s doctors.  Id. at 29; see also $1.55M Verdict Against a Football Doctor Reversed, NAT’L 
L.J., Apr. 2, 2001, at A12. 
 96. Treatment Cut Hockey Player’s Career Short, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 18, 2002, at B2. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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One might reasonably query why athletes continue to suit up knowing that 
they are injured.  In addition to strong personal drive to return to the game,99 
players face severe penalties for refusing to play when they have been cleared 
medically.100  Hakeem Olajuwon was suspended by the NBA’s Houston 
Rockets for refusing to play injured after doctors gave him approval to do 
so.101  The team physician claimed his injury was healed, while Olajuwon 
believed the opposite to be the case.102  Olajuwon further alleged that the 
physician was influenced by the loyalty he owed to team management, while 
the team countered that Olajuwon’s refusal was just a ploy in his contract 
negotiations.103  In addition to possible suspensions or fines, players who resist 
playing hurt due to pain also face scrutiny from management and coaches.  
Jacksonville Jaguars head coach Tom Coughlin was heard to call injured 
athletes “[t]he sick, lame and lazy.”104  Dr. Huizenga of the L.A. Raiders 
detailed the constant pressure that owner Al Davis placed on running back 
Marcus Allen to take shots in order to return to the field despite his injuries and 
pain.105  This pressure is difficult to resist for any player, especially those who 
lack the star status of Allen and risk being released from their team if they do 
not follow the doctor’s or coach’s orders. 
The scope of conflicts due to physicians’ dual loyalty to both the athlete–
patient and to the team includes not only treatment of player injuries, but also 
pain management.  One of the earliest player lawsuits on this matter was 
brought by Dick Butkus, former linebacker for the Chicago Bears.106  Butkus 
alleged that the weekly pain-killing injections he received for a knee injury 
were administered without adequate informed consent regarding the 
complications.107  He settled his lawsuit for $600,000 in 1976 and still suffers 
from permanent injuries today as a result of his treatment.108  In a 1978 lawsuit 
against the team physician for the Portland Trailblazers, Bill Walton similarly 
alleged that the doctor had injected heavy painkillers into his injured feet 
before games and failed to inform him of the risks associated with continuing 
 
 99. This attitude is summed up by the often-cited battle cry, “no pain, no gain.”  Virtually all 
professional athletes would prefer to play rather than sit in the trainer’s room.  A prominent recent 
example is the pain endured by Boston Red Sox pitcher Curt Schilling as he carried his team to 
the American League Pennant and World Series title despite playing with a torn tendon-sheath in 
his ankle.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Olajuwon Seeks Way to Protest Suspension, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at 105. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Roberts, supra note 34, at D5. 
 105. See HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 165–69. 
 106. Polsky, supra note 72, at 521. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Nocera, supra note 40, at 84. 
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to play.109  Moreover, in response to concerns about the long-term effects of 
heavy painkillers in treating injuries, the Cincinnati Bengals recently stopped 
using such medications on the field.110  The common sense rationale for the 
decision was that using these masking agents during a game could conceal 
serious injury that was in need of treatment.111  Simply killing the pain can lead 
to a player further injuring himself, jeopardizing his long-term health and 
career. 
In addition to survey data and litigation, there is further evidence of player 
concern regarding decisions made by team physicians.112  Quite tellingly, 
players are increasingly taking medical care into their own hands.  They are 
seeking second opinions more often, and all major players’ unions are now 
encouraging and helping to facilitate the practice.113  In fact, the NFL Players 
Association website today posts a list of doctors who are available to render 
second opinions for players on every team.114  The most recent Major League 
Baseball and National Football League collective bargaining agreements both 
provide that players have the “right” to second medical opinions.115  The NFL 
Players Union has also attempted to change their collective bargaining 
agreement to provide for greater independence to team physicians.116  Some 
players are eschewing team doctors entirely—Barry Bonds, for instance, hires 
 
 109. Polsky, supra note 72, at 521; Nocera, supra note 40, at 84.  The case settled out of 
court.  Nocera, supra note 40, at 84. 
 110. Ken Gordon, Bengals Trainer Disdains Needle and Damage Done, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 2002, at 2D. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See, e.g., Lotysz v. Montgomery, 766 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).  In 
Lotysz’s medical malpractice action against team physicians, amicus briefs were filed in Lotysz’s 
favor by the National Football League Players Association, Major League Baseball Players 
Association, National Basketball Players Association, National Hockey League Players 
Association, and Professional Hockey Players Association.  Id. 
 113. See Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13. 
 114. NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION SECOND OPINION LISTING (2005), 
http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=Second+Opinions. 
 115. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, 2003–2006 BASIC AGREEMENT  
45–46, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf [hereinafter MLBPA BASIC 
AGREEMENT] (requiring at Article XIII(D) that teams provide players with an accepted list of 
specialists that they may see as part of their contract); NFL CBA, supra note 26, at art. XLIV 
(permitting a player to seek a second opinion; but requiring the player to consult the team 
physician prior to doing so, and entitling the team physician to issue her own report concerning 
the findings of the second physician). 
 116. Gene Wojciechowski & Chris Dufresne, Delicate Procedures: NFL Team Physicians 
Must Provide Proper Care to Injured Players and Please Management at Same Time, L.A. 
TIMES, June 26, 1988, Part III (Sports), at 12. 
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his own trainer to help with his back pain instead of relying on the San 
Francisco Giants’ staff of medical care providers.117 
Moreover, doctors themselves have expressed concern over management 
involvement in decisions regarding player care.  Dr. Huizenga, former 
president of the NFL Physicians Society, has aggressively argued that steps 
must be taken to remove management pressures on medical decisions.118  Dr. 
Michael Lawhon, team doctor for the Cincinnati Reds, resigned from the 
organization in 1991 saying that he could not “continue to engage in a situation 
that has a front office which does not consider the medical team and its 
players’ health a priority.”119  Lawhon urges that reforms need to be made to 
combat “a lack of support and honesty from the front office, continued second-
guessing and misleading reports about injuries.”120  Dr. Arthur Caplan, director 
of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Bioethics, also laments the dual 
loyalty problems confronted by team physicians and advocates for change.121  
Caplan argues that physicians cannot meet their obligation to look after the 
welfare of their patients when their interests are also inextricably linked to the 
needs of their employer and the franchise.122  John Cadigan, former team 
physician for the New England Patriots, decries the erosion of trust that has 
resulted from players viewing doctors as part of the team’s management, rather 
than as advocates for the athlete’s best medical interests.123  He proposes 
fundamental alterations to the employment relationship between teams and 
doctors as a sensible response to today’s conflicts.124 
Finally, mounting evidence exists that due to the pressures that team 
physicians face, they are increasingly engaging in unethical behavior when it 
comes to designating players eligible for injured reserve.125  Because the NFL 
limits the number of players who can remain on their team’s active roster, 
physicians sometimes coach athletes to fake injuries.126  By doing so, the 
 
 117. See Ken Daley, A Bonds Primer: How He’s Making History: Several Factors Propelling 
the Drive for 70, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2, 2001, at 5B. 
 118. See HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 316–17. 
 119. Doctor for Reds Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1991, at B19. 
 120. Id.  For example, another physician, Dr. Arthur Caplan, urges that Miranda-style 
warnings disclosing the conflicts that doctors face be given to athlete–patients.  See infra notes 
151–52 and accompanying text. 
 121. Sabin Russell, Rice’s Injury Puts Spotlight on Team Doctors: Pressure to Win Conflicts 
with Players’ Need to Heal, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18, 1997, at A1. 
 122. See id. at A8.  Caplan adds that it is highly unusual for doctors to practice medicine in 
the face of such significant economic pressures adverse to independent medical judgment.  Id. 
 123. See Hal Habib, When Injuries Rob Athletes, Who’s to Blame?, PALM BEACH POST, June 
16, 2002, at 1C. 
 124. See id. at 14C; see also infra Part IV.A (recommending that physicians be hired by the 
league rather than by individual teams). 
 125. See, e.g., SCRANTON, supra note 36, at 54–55. 
 126. See id. 
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player can be placed on injured reserve and avoid being released from the 
team.127  One team referred to the practice as providing “rookie scholarships,” 
under which a player would fake an injury, receive his full salary, and then 
attempt to make the team the following season.128  Team doctors are pressured 
to enable this fraudulent practice by pretending to treat the uninjured player.  
As a rationalization, one team physician clearly revealed the conflict of interest 
he faced, stating: “We were hired to protect the players’ health and to 
[simultaneously] look out for the team’s interests, and that’s exactly what we 
did.”129  Fortunately, the NFL has attempted to curtail these rookie 
scholarships in recent years by limiting the number of players permitted on 
injured reserve.130  Nevertheless, if a physician were to coach a patient to feign 
an injury in any other context (such as a court trial), she would be in outright 
violation of AMA medical ethics guidelines and face serious consequences.131  
Again, however, we witness the toll of the employment conflicts on team 
doctors, pressuring them to compromise medical ethics in order to achieve the 
goals of their employer. 
IV.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
A. Eliminate the Team Physician Entirely and Hire Doctors Through the 
League or Players Union 
Given the perils and incentives created by the conflicts of interest detailed 
above, we must consider policy options that would mitigate or remove the 
problem entirely.  Fundamentally restructuring the current employment 
relationship between teams, physicians, and players is in the best interest of all 
three parties.  Players would benefit because they would know their best 
interests were now being held paramount by their treating physician, which in 
turn would increase their confidence and trust in the medical advice being 
offered.  Players could further expect to be provided with complete 
information about the potential complications of treatment options, and at the 
same time, would be more willing to reveal all information relevant in treating 
them.132  Ideally, this would lead to an overall improvement in long-term 
 
 127. See id. 
 128. HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 199. 
 129. SCRANTON, supra note 36, at 55. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 12, at xiv (Preamble) (“A 
physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all professional interactions, 
and strive to report physicians deficient in character or competence, or engaging in fraud or 
deception, to appropriate entities.”). 
 132. Under the current system, one might reasonably speculate that if a player knows his 
doctor is advising his coach on which athletes he thinks can perform well versus those he feels 
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player health and the doctor–patient relationship.  Doctors would benefit from 
an employment restructuring because they would no longer be placed in the 
ethically uncomfortable situation of being pressured by management to make 
medical decisions that could be adverse to a player’s best interests.  Moreover, 
physicians may even be able to lower their malpractice costs by avoiding 
lawsuits that allege fraudulent medical care on the theory that the doctor’s 
loyalty was not with the player.133  Finally, sports franchises would reap long- 
term benefits because their players would be in better health and ideally be 
able to extend their playing careers.134 
The most obvious method to fundamentally change the physician’s 
employment relationship would be to no longer have teams hire physicians.  
The players’ unions and the professional sports leagues are the most obvious 
organizations that could take over this responsibility.135  Both players136 and 
physicians137 have reasonably proposed such a move.  Players’ unions only 
represent the interest of the athletes that comprise their membership.  Thus, 
physicians hired by the union would owe their loyalty solely to the players they 
treat.  In this manner, a far more traditional doctor–patient relationship would 
be created in which an athlete could trust that his physician had only his well-
being at heart.138  Today’s dual loyalty that physicians owe to both players and 
organizations—and the corresponding conflict of interest created—would be 
eliminated.  Furthermore, if the players’ union hired physicians, then they 
could be categorized as independent contractors, which would in turn remove 
workers’ compensation law as the exclusive remedy for injuries.139  Players 
would be permitted to bring negligence suits for medical malpractice against 
 
cannot, that player would be apt to conceal adverse health information for fear of losing playing 
time. 
 133. See supra notes 85–98 and accompanying text (detailing malpractice litigation against 
team physicians). 
 134. Obviously, this is a benefit only if teams care about the long-run horizon.  Presumably, if 
they did, they might institute some of the reforms suggested in this Paper on their own.  The fact 
that teams have generally not done so may be evidence that providing healthcare free from 
conflicts of interest may indeed be less than profit maximizing. 
 135. See Solares, supra note 9, at 249–53; Justin P. Caldarone, Comment, Professional Team 
Doctors: Money, Prestige, and Ethical Dilemmas, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 131, 150 (2002); DiCello, 
supra note 10, at 534–35. 
 136. See Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13. 
 137. See Habib, supra note 123, at 14C (noting that former team physician for the New 
England Patriots recommended that the league be responsible for hiring team physicians, rather 
than individual teams).  
 138. See Herbert, supra note 79, at 257–58. 
 139. Id. at 275. 
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the doctors they hire, thereby incentivizing physicians to offer the best medical 
care and advice possible.140 
The collective bargaining agreements for the professional players’ unions 
provide an excellent vehicle to create these new relationships between players 
and their physicians.  The NFL collective bargaining agreement expires in 
2007,141 the NBA’s expired after the 2005 season,142 and the Major League 
Baseball collective bargaining agreement is set to end in December of 2006.143  
Through these collective bargaining negotiations, players’ unions have the ripe 
opportunity to alleviate the longstanding tension between players and doctors 
and to remove the conflict of interest that team physicians confront.144  In fact, 
leaders of the NFL Players Union have already expressed a desire to discuss 
long-term consequences of medical decisions in their next collective 
bargaining agreement.145  The Union has understandably made healthcare a 
priority concern after its 2000 survey revealed concerns with medical care by 
team physicians and demonstrated that players strongly believe that second 
medical opinions should be mandatory.146  The Union is currently considering 
what proactive steps can be taken, including instituting a grievance procedure 
against doctors.147  Of course, the superior option would be to end the 
grievances once and for all. 
Besides using the collective bargaining process, a second option to 
restructure the employment relationship of team physicians would be to require 
the professional sports league itself to hire the doctors rather than its players 
 
 140. Cf. Lotysz v. Montgomery, 766 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Hendy v. Losse, 
819 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1991) (prohibiting negligence claims of professional athletes from 
proceeding because workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for those injured by a co-
employee physician acting in the scope of employment). 
 141. Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13. 
 142. NBA Extends Deal with Players Union, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 2003, at E2.  The NBA 
recently reached a new collective bargaining agreement with players that was ratified this 
summer.  See Associated Press News Service, League, Players Get New CBA Done Before 
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While salary cap and revenue sharing remained dominant issues, little was done to remedy 
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15, 2004, at D6. 
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union.148  John Cadigan of the New England Patriots recently called for such a 
reform, proposing that the NFL hire doctors directly rather than the teams.149  
This alternative would similarly remove the pressures placed by management 
on physicians and would return the distorted doctor–athlete relationship back 
to the realm of a more traditional doctor–patient relationship.150  Ultimately, 
however, players might still be skeptical of league involvement in light of the 
close relationship between leagues and the individual teams that comprise 
them.  If this is a significant concern, having the players’ union hire physicians 
directly would be the superior reform to eliminate both actual and perceived 
conflicts of interest. 
B. Mandatory Conflict Disclosure 
If a radical employment change proves too difficult to negotiate, team 
doctors should at the very least be required by law and league policy to 
affirmatively disclose their financial relationships and conflicts of interest to 
players.151  This disclosure would include any ownership interests held by the 
physician, the products endorsed by the team or her medical group, and 
whether the physician made contributions to the team in exchange for being 
named the “official” healthcare provider.152  The purpose of mandating conflict 
disclosure would be to inform athletes of all relevant information regarding 
their healthcare choices and to promote trust and openness in what many see as 
a damaged relationship. 
Dr. Arthur Caplan of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Bioethics 
has expanded upon this disclosure principle.  In light of the team physician’s 
conflict of interest, Caplan believes there should be a “Miranda-style warning 
[given] to every player informing him that he not only has the right but the 
obligation to get his own personal physician.”153  He added that “[n]o 
professional athlete should ever have to depend solely on the team doctor for 
his medical treatment.”154 
 
 148. See DiCello, supra note 10, at 535. 
 149. Habib, supra note 123, at 14C. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See Keim, supra note 10, at 223–24. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Wolff & Stone, supra note 41, at 12 (referencing the Supreme Court ruling in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requiring that police inform arrestees of certain rights before 
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none of what is said is privileged.  See Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to “Non-
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While such a warning would promote candor and be a step in the right 
direction, the mere existence of mandatory disclosures would not remove the 
underlying conflict of interest problem.  A warning would directly 
acknowledge the issue and raise athletes’ awareness, but would not implement 
the fundamental change in the physician’s employment relationship necessary 
to remove the divergence of interests that she must satisfy.155 
C. Physician Agreements to Assert Independence 
Some sports medicine followers have proposed that physicians enter into 
agreements with team management under which they explicitly assert their 
authority to make decisions free from team interference.156  This type of 
agreement would ensure that the physician’s relationship with the franchise is 
purely professional, and that the doctor was not considered “part of the 
team.”157  Moreover, such agreements should include the elimination of 
incentives witnessed today for team physicians based on a successful season, 
such as the championship rings and financial bonuses based on wins.158  These 
agreements must also prohibit physicians from being involved in questionable 
behavior such as inappropriately placing players on injured reserve.159  If such 
contracts could be reached, they might mitigate the concern that physicians 
who are emotionally or financially invested in the team might lose their 
objectivity when making medical decisions.160 
However, much like proposed “Miranda warnings” to players, this 
prophylactic measure would not fundamentally alter the physician’s 
relationship to the team in such a way as to remove the conflict of interest.  
Even if these agreements existed, the potential for implicit interference from 
management in daily medical decisions would create the same dual loyalty 
problems for doctors as those seen today.  Furthermore, the growing 
prevalence of marketing agreements between teams and their medical 
providers—under which physicians pay significant sums of money for the 
privilege of providing healthcare services—makes it unlikely that physicians 
possess the bargaining clout necessary to assert their independence and their 
complete control over medical decisions affecting athletes.161 
 
 155. There is additional cause to be skeptical of the effect that mandatory disclosures would 
have.  In the criminal law context, for example, studies have shown that Miranda warnings have 
had relatively little inhibiting effect on suspects’ willingness to talk to the police.  See Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 456 (1987). 
 156. See Keim, supra note 10, at 220–21; Caldarone, supra note 135, at 150. 
 157. See Caldarone, supra note 135, at 150. 
 158. Id.; DiCello, supra note 10, at 535. 
 159. See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text; see also Polsky, supra note 72, at 526. 
 160. See Caldarone, supra note 135, at 150–51. 
 161. See Polsky, supra note 72, at 525. 
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D. Ban Advertising of Physicians’ Relationship with Teams 
The dramatic rise of marketing arrangements between teams and physician 
groups over the last decade leads a reasonable mind to conclude that the 
primary value of being named a team’s official healthcare provider is the 
public relations benefit, not the compensation received for rendering medical 
services.  In turn, doctors may become so preoccupied with preserving the 
marketing edge associated with being a team’s official provider that their 
medical care decisions suffer.162  One potential method of alleviating this 
growing problem (short of the more fundamental solutions above) would 
simply be to ban advertising that highlights physicians’ relationships with 
teams.  If the marketing edge that physician groups now enjoy was strictly 
prevented by league policy, doctors would no longer engage in bidding wars to 
win the right to service athletes at below-market rates (or for free).  Moreover, 
their healthcare advice and decision-making would not be influenced by the 
pressure to keep the position as a way of attracting future clients.  Thus, merely 
limiting the “PR” use of having a healthcare contract with a team would go a 
long way towards eliminating some conflicts that physicians face. 
E. Modify Workers’ Compensation Laws 
Finally, some critics of the current legal liability regime (or lack thereof) 
support the notion that workers’ compensation statutes should be reconsidered 
to meet the goals that they were originally created to satisfy.163  Traditionally, 
these statutes offered protections to employees injured on the job that they 
might not otherwise be able to negotiate or receive on their own.  In the 
professional sports context, however, they serve primarily to shield teams and 
their physicians from medical malpractice liability while simultaneously 
offering dramatically inadequate compensation to reimburse an injured player 
for his expected loss.164  By modifying these statutes to exempt professional 
sports franchises, athlete-employees would regain the necessary leverage 
afforded by the threat of litigation against team physicians who do not hold the 
player’s interest first and foremost in their healthcare decisions.165  In this 
manner, the spirit of workers’ compensation laws—that employees be 
adequately compensated for their injuries—would be satisfied, and teams and 
 
 162. See Pennington, supra note 38, at D4 (discussing Dr. Andrew Bishop’s concern that “if 
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their physicians would no longer be able to hide under the shield of legislation 
that was never intended to deprive athletes of just compensation.166 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, it has become increasingly clear that team physicians in 
professional sports face serious conflicts of interest created by their competing 
loyalties to both the athlete–patient that they treat and to the team that employs 
them.  The conflict is compounded by the recent rise of marketing agreements 
whereby physician groups pay significant sums of money in order to have the 
right to be designated the official healthcare provider of a prestigious sports 
franchise.  In response, professional sports leagues and their players must 
adopt measures that would alleviate the worsening conflicts and enhance 
protections for athlete–patients.  Most fundamentally, the character of the 
current employment relationship between teams and their physicians must be 
drastically altered by requiring doctors be hired directly by the players’ union 
or by the league itself.  In this manner, the dual loyalty problem that team 
physicians face today (i.e., Do they serve the interests of the team which 
employs them or the welfare of the player-patient they treat?) would be 
removed.  Physicians could then resume a more traditional and trusting doctor–
patient relationship with the athletes they see, and players’ confidence in the 
medical decisions being rendered would rise significantly.  If such a change 
proves politically impossible to institute, at the very least physicians should be 
required to disclose the conflicts of interest they face to their athlete–patients. 
In addition, reputable physician groups should insist on negotiating 
healthcare provision agreements that stress the independence of their medical 
judgment from the other interests being sought by team management.  
Moreover, banning the ability of physicians to advertise their affiliation with a 
sports franchise would substantially cut down on the willingness of medical 
groups to defer to team management simply to preserve the “PR” benefit of 
their relationship.  Finally, state legislatures might consider amending workers 
compensation statutes to remove coverage of professional sports teams, 
because in this unique arena, such laws actually work to hurt the employee 
(athlete) that they were originally intended to protect.  In the final analysis, I 
believe the best hope lies with players and their league to use the collective 
bargaining process to reform physicians’ employment relationship with teams, 
and to ensure that the medical care being provided to athletes who risk serious 
 
 166. See id.  However, since workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for most 
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injury on a daily basis is never again compromised in the interest of financial 
gain. 
 
